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Executive summary
Four trends are reshaping the European energy system: decarbonisation, digitalisation 
and, as a result of the two, decentralisation and convergence. 
Based on strong public policies, decarbonisation is reshuffling the European energy mix, 
while innovation in digital technologies is enabling disruptive change in the way energy sys-
tems are operated. This enables the European energy system to become more decentralised 
with increasing interaction between services (electricity, heat, transport, data) that used to be 
largely separate.
In this new context, cities are the key arenas of decarbonisation. However, European Union 
(EU) energy and climate governance is based on top-down policies that are not complement-
ed by a solid bottom-up system that ensures consistency of EU, national and local measures 
and incentivises decarbonisation at city level. 
We propose better integration of top-down energy and climate policy mechanisms with 
new bottom-up incentives that aim to promote decarbonisation at city level. This mechanism 
can be set up in four steps.
• Step 1: understand a city’s carbon footprint and create a baseline scenario. A participating 
city should start by carrying out an emissions inventory that would quantify the amount of 
greenhouse gases emitted from energy consumption on its territory during a specific year. 
This should identify the principal sources of emissions and therefore enable prioritisation 
of reduction measures.
• Step 2: understand a city’s carbon handprint and create a reference scenario. With an emis-
sions inventory in place, each city can identify the areas of its economy with the greatest 
decarbonisation potential, and can prioritise its decarbonisation policies accordingly.
• Step 3: create a city Climate Plan. The baseline and reference scenarios would form the 
basis of comprehensive city Climate Plans. To ensure consistency of national and mu-
nicipal policies, Climate Plans could be developed as a sub-component of member state 
National Energy and Climate Plans.
• Step 4: track progress and allocate financial support. City progress reports on decarbon-
isation should be used by the EU to determine the eligibility of local governments for EU 
grants. Grants would be key to the success of this scheme. If EU money is given to a city 
to implement a project listed in its Climate Plan, it should be paid in in biennial tranches, 
conditional on positive progress reports. 
A grant-based system would give the EU some control over the effective implementation 
of cities’ decarbonisation projects. EU countries could use city progress reports to provide 
fiscal incentives to cities that implement in practice their Climate Plans. This premium system 
would make economic sense for member states considering that the better cities perform in 
terms of decarbonisation, the easier it will be to achieve national decarbonisation targets.
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Decarbonisation and digitalisation are 
reshaping the EU energy system
The EU’s energy and climate policy architecture has at its core an aim to deliver decarbon-
isation. On the basis of a long-term vision of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions by 80-95 
percent by 2050 compared to 1990 (Figure 1), the EU adopted a binding 40 percent emissions 
reduction target percent to be achieved by 2030 compared to 1990. This target is also the 
basis of the EU’s international commitment to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change Paris Agreement1.
Figure 1: EU greenhouse gas emissions reduction scenario under current policies: 
not yet in line with the 2050 target (1990=100%)
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (2016).
Turning these targets into reality is challenging. It requires radical changes to Europe’s 
power, heating and cooling, industry and transport sectors.
This task can become even more challenging if the global effort against global warming is 
further strengthened. The current EU 2050 decarbonisation trajectory is calibrated against the 
target of keeping the global temperature rise this century below 2 degrees Celsius compared 
to pre-industrial levels. This is also the central aim of the Paris Agreement. But the Paris 
Agreement also pledges to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees 
Celsius (a significantly safer defence line against the worst impacts of a changing climate) 
(United Nations, 2015).
Digitalisation, by making the overall energy system smarter and more efficient, can be an 
important catalyst for decarbonisation. Digital technologies give consumers more control 
over their energy use and offer benefits from additional services. At the same time, suppliers 
can optimise their operations and develop new offers, and system operators can benefit from 
new tools to manage their grids more efficiently and to integrate an increasing amount of 
variable renewables into the system. Interaction between intelligent appliances, smart grids 
and home platforms – mediated by or on behalf of consumers – can usher in a new era with 
radically different consumption patterns centred on automation and remote controls.
From a technological perspective, energy is already going digital. The share of patents in 
1 See Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (2015).
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which energy and IT co-occur has boomed since 2006, largely outpacing traditional patents in 
IT and energy taken individually (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Share of IT and energy tech in total patents, EU28, index=1995
Source: Bruegel based on PATSTAT (2014). Note: The graph shows the share of patents related to specific IPC codes among all PCT patents 
with at least one European inventor in a given year indexed in 1995. Share of patents in total patents, first priority application under the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), classified with IPC codes H02 or G06 with at least one inventor from the EU28. The graph is based on 
international patent applications under the PCT retrieved from the PATSTAT database. Counts are derived using the priority date (first date 
of filing of a patent application) and the inventors’ country of residence, where at least one inventor came from the EU28. The International 
Patent Classification system (IPC) is used to distinguish patents relevant to energy generation technology and IT. In particular, the clas-
sification codes H02 – ‘Generation, Conversion, or Distribution of Electric Power’ – and G06 – ‘Computing; Calculating; Counting’ – were 
taken into consideration. All inventions in the database are classified with at least one IPC code but classifications in multiple groups is 
common. In the latter case, the patent is counted in equal fractions towards each technology.
The EU energy system is decentralising and 
converging with other services
This rapid technological evolution means digitalisation is set to be a key enabler for the trans-
formation of the European energy system, from the traditional static and centralised model, 
into a more dynamic and decentralised eco-system within which a wide range of players 
interact in a flexible system.
For instance, according to the International Energy Agency (2016e), since 2010 leading 
markets such as Europe have seen a cost reduction for decentralised-scale solar PV installa-
tions of 40-75 percent. This trend has allowed the increasing deployment of these small-scale 
installations. Germany illustrates this well: between 2012 and 2015, installations with a capac-
ity below 10 megawatts (eg rooftop solar PV) grew by 3 percentage points and now represent 
37 percent of the total power plant park in Germany. At this speed, small-scale installations 
will represent half of Germany’s power plant park by 2030.
Also between 2012 and 2015, about 27,000 small-scale storage systems (eg domestic appli-
ances combined with rooftop solar panels) with a total of 136 MWh of storage capacity were 
installed in Germany2.
Trends in ownership of energy generation capacity also illustrate the progressive decentrali-
sation of the European energy system. Private citizens and farmers in Germany now own almost 
half of the country’s installed renewable energy capacity, while in Denmark, private individuals 
own 85 percent of the country’s wind turbines (i24c, 2016). Scale efficiency (larger units are 
2 See Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF (2016) p39.
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cheaper per kilowatt and/or more efficient than smaller units), which justified larger central 
plants in the past, has apparently become less important. In 1998, the investment cost for coal 
and gas plants decreased with size; this relationship is no longer visible (Figure 3, 2015 data).
Figure 3: Relationship between installation size and investment cost 
Source: Bruegel based on IEA Projected Cost of Electricity generation (1998 and 2015). Note: MWe = megawatt electric, or the electric 
output of a power plant in megawatts. kWe = kilowatt electric, or one thousand watts of electric capacity.
But decarbonisation and digitalisation do not just drive energy system decentralisation. 
They also drive convergence of services (electricity, heat, transport, data) that used to be 
largely separated. Figure 4 illustrates this how this works. Technological developments now 
enable households to not only consume electricity, heat, transport and data services, but also 
to provide them. Rooftop solar already produces significant amounts of electricity. Personal 
computers connected to services such as the start-up Idle Computing3 can offer their compu-
tation power to others over the web. Vehicle sharing can be arranged through new peer-to-
peer services such as getaround.com. Domestically produced heat might be fed back into 
heat networks. Furthermore, households can provide heat and electricity storage. This has 
been enabled by a number of innovations that allow smaller scale units (such as heat pumps, 
batteries, solar panels) to become almost as cost efficient as their large-scale counterparts 
(combined heat and power plants, pump storage, nuclear power plants). These developments 
reinforce the decentralisation of the energy system.
3 This start-up collects computation power into a grid and sells it to different sectors across the globe.
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Potentially more disruptive, some technologies lead to a convergence of electricity, heat-
ing, transport and data. Figure 4 conveys this idea by looking at the relationship between two 
neighbouring regions. If, for example, the wind is not blowing in region B, it might not only be 
compensated for by increasing production from the combined heat and power plant in region 
A (which might be diffi  cult when electricity transmission is congested), but also by a reduc-
tion in electricity consumption by region B’s data centre. Th e consequent shortfall of compu-
tational power would then be replaced by increasing utilisation of the data centre in region A. 
Th e connection between data centres therefore substitutes to some extent for the electricity 
interconnection. In addition, household energy storage units and the batteries of electric 
vehicles might release electricity when needed. However, if the wind is blowing strongly, the 
combined heat and power plant might be surplus to requirements. Currently, if electricity is 
too cheap, the plant would just continue to work in heating mode. But new heating systems 
might become more bi-directional with households using not just some of the heat stored 
underground, but also using the heat-pump to transform some of the cheap electricity from 
wind into additional heat. Furthermore, the data centre might be increasingly used for the 
value of its by-produced excess heat.
Figure 4: Convergence of electricity, heating, transport and data
Source: Bruegel.
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Cities are emerging as the key arenas of 
decarbonisation
With the energy system becoming more decentralised, and with the progressive convergence 
of electricity, heat and transport, cities will emerge as the key arenas for EU decarbonisation. 
In fact, certain decarbonisation options can be better, or only, implemented at city level, as 
the following examples illustrate.
Half of the energy consumed in the EU is devoted to the heating and cooling of buildings, 
industry and businesses (Figure 5). As heat/cold cannot be efficiently transported over long 
distances, it is produced and consumed locally. These markets will thus remain local. 
Solutions such as district heating and cooling can contribute to the decarbonisation of the 
sector, particularly if based on clean fuels such as renewable electricity (through heat pumps), 
geothermal and solar thermal energy and waste heat from industry. The same logic applies 
to co-generation of heat and power, which can produce substantial energy and emissions 
reductions compared to separate generation. District heating and cooling systems can also 
store significant volumes of energy and thus might serve as a buffer enabling more energy 
production at local level from variable renewables.
Figure 5: The crucial role of heating and cooling in the EU energy system
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (2016a).
Digitalisation offers an unprecedented opportunity to advance along this path (IEA, 
2016a). For instance, with digital technology, buildings are evolving from being stand-alone 
energy-consuming units to becoming energy hubs that consume, produce, store and supply 
energy more flexibly than before (Building Performance Institute Europe, 2016). Build-
ings could progressively generate energy with on-site renewable systems (eg rooftop solar 
photovoltaic or solar thermal panels), provide storage for electric and thermal energy (IEA, 
2016c), and deliver demand-response in an integrated manner, thanks also to smart meters, 
smart thermostats, lighting controls and other load-control technologies with smart end-use 
devices (IEA, 2015).
The deployment of these innovative solutions can be fostered by stronger coordination 
at local level, where synergies between the various sectors can be better exploited. Much 
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of the challenge of integrating different sectors and parties relates to the standardisation of 
interfaces4.
Defining these at European level will be a long and complex exercise – also because of the 
competing interests of different players. In the absence of top-down guidance, local stand-
ards might be more easily agreed based on local preconditions (such as existence of a district 
heating network or presence of a municipal utility), enabling efficient deployment of smart 
technology in line with local circumstances.
Transport is the EU’s second most important contributor of greenhouse-gas emissions 
(European Environment Agency, 2016b). The sector still heavily relies on oil (94 percent; 
European Commission, 2016b), and is also the main source of air pollution. Road transport 
is the predominant contributor with passenger cars, trucks and buses generating more than 
70 percent of the sector’s emissions (Figure 6). As about 70 percent of Europeans live in cities, 
much of this activity happens at city level.
Decarbonising transportation will be a difficult challenge for Europe (European Environ-
ment Agency, 2016a), but cities can make a major contribution. For instance, use of public 
transport could increase substantially, as digital technologies can make public transport more 
accessible and integrated. Large-scale data analysis can help in optimising service frequency 
and density, making public transport more efficient and attractive to citizens. Walking and 
cycling – the cheapest, lowest-emission, most-accessible forms of mobility – can be promoted 
by creating/extending pedestrian zones, bike lanes and bike sharing systems in cities (Euro-
pean Commission, 2016b).
All these options require decisive action at city level. 
BOX 1: EUROPE’S LOCAL CLIMATE ACTION FRONTRUNNER: COPENHAGEN
The need for local action in decarbonisation is exemplified by Copenhagen. In 2009, the 
city council adopted the ‘CPH 2025 Climate Plan’, structured around the target of becoming 
carbon neutral by 2025. Since then, the city has rapidly evolved, significantly reducing CO2 
emissions through changes in energy production, consumption and mobility.
For instance, the city: i) promoted a district heating system to which almost all households 
are now connected; ii) created a new district cooling system that uses harbour water, saving 
70 percent of energy compared to traditional air-conditioning; iii) increased mobility through 
integrated transport and cycling solutions; iv) replaced high-pressure sodium lamps with 
highly efficient LEDs.
Governance-wise, this was only possible because of the high level of decentralisation of 
Denmark’s public sector. With the public sector reform of 2007, municipalities grew larger 
and took over more responsibilities from the regional and the state levels. 
Specifically, municipalities became responsible for activities such as ‘Technology and 
the environment’, covering environmental sector planning, preparation of regulations on 
construction, roads, transportation and waste management. The 2007 reforms also gave more 
fiscal power to local authorities, to allow them to meet the new responsibilities. As Katz and 
Noring (2016) point out, the establishment of publicly-owned corporations (eg the Greater 
Copenhagen Utility) and of innovative public-private partnerships has contributed to the 
success of the model.
Public investment in cities has always represented a significant share of government 
spending (Figure 7). In 2014, local government expenditures in the EU amounted to 11.3 per-
cent of GDP and 23.5 percent of total public expenditure. Local public investment is responsi-
4 For example, which type of information is exchanged by which technology and based on which data protocol.
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ble for 44 percent of total public investment (OECD, 2016). In many cities, network infrastruc-
ture – such as roads, tramway and suburban train lines, but also gas and electricity networks 
– is publicly owned. Even if this is not the case, local authorities can strongly influence the 
development of such infrastructure. At the same time, local public buildings represent a 
significant share of the total building stock5. However, local authorities do not respond to the 
same incentives as the private sector. Local authorities are typically elected for limited peri-
ods and voters might not put the right value on local greenhouse gas reductions, in particular 
because citizens of ambitious cities might bear the cost of decarbonisation without receiving 
a direct benefit. Thus, citizens might find it more convenient to equip local coal-fired heating 
plants with expensive scrubbers than to entirely redesign the district heating system. In 
addition, the budget constraints of local authorities are typically a consequence of complex 
intra-country transfer schemes. This – together with the short electoral cycles – implies that 
local authorities underinvest in infrastructure that pays off in the long term.
Figure 6: EU greenhouse-gas emissions from the transport sector by category 
(2014)
Source: Bruegel based on European Environment Agency database, accessed in November 2016. 
Figure 7: EU local government investment by economic function (2013)
Source: Bruegel based on OECD (2016).
5  For example, around 17 percent and 35 percent respectively of the floor area in German and French non-residential 
buildings comprises hospitals and education institutions, according to www.buildingsdata.eu.
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EU energy and climate governance also 
needs to be bottom-up
EU energy and climate policy is driven by the long-term vision of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by 80-95 percent by 2050 in comparison to 1990 levels. This vision is being pursued 
through intermediate steps: the 2020 Climate and Energy Package and the 2030 Climate and 
Energy Framework. Both of these include greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets (20 
percent reduction by 2020 and 40 percent reduction by 2030), which are binding through 
the EU emissions trading system (ETS) and the related effort-sharing decision, which covers 
non-ETS parts of the economy. There are also targets for the increase in renewable energy 
(20 percent of total consumption by 2020; 27 percent by 2030) and of energy efficiency (20 
percent saving by 2020 compared to baseline; 27 percent by 2030) (Figure 8).
However, while in the 2020 package renewable energy targets were binding at national 
level through the Renewable Energy Directive and the Energy Efficiency Directive set out 
binding measures to help the EU reach its energy efficiency target6, in the 2030 Framework 
they are binding only at EU level. Formally, this is to allow greater flexibility to EU countries, 
in line with the provisions in Article 194(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) on the issue of national control over the energy mix. However, EU states do not 
have a common vision on how EU energy markets should be organised. They therefore seek 
maximum flexibility in order to implement their national energy policies.
This situation raises questions about how the 2030 Framework, and therefore the longer-
term 2050 vision, can concretely be implemented, and consequently brings the issue of gov-
ernance into the spotlight. While the lack of strong EU policies allows member countries to 
continue with policies that fragment the internal energy market, the lack of binding national 
targets carries the risk that national efforts will not add up to the EU aggregate commitments. 
Only a solid governance structure can guarantee the achievement of the 2030 targets in the 
absence of binding obligations for member states. In particular, without a strong and reliable 
governance system, investor confidence might be undermined and the investments needed 
for decarbonisation postponed.
The European Commission’s solution to this need for strong governance has been to ask 
member states to adopt national energy and climate plans (NECPs), with biennial progress 
reports on their implementation. These plans should outline the state of national energy sys-
tems, national climate policies and national policy frameworks for all five parts of the Energy 
Union (eg energy security, internal energy market, energy efficiency, climate action, research 
and innovation7). This system should enable timely assessment of progress and forecasts of 
the fulfilment of EU energy policy objectives and agreed climate and energy targets in each 
country (European Council, 2015). The introduction of the NECP system is predicted to 
foster the consistency of EU member state energy and climate measures, and ensure that the 
EU-wide 2030 targets on renewables and efficiency are actually reached.
In this context, local action for decarbonisation is incentivised in either direct and indirect 
ways, from the ETS for local fixed-source pollution to national implementation of EU direc-
tives that force local authorities to act (eg the Energy Efficiency Directive mandates reno-
vation of public buildings). However, this system is still far from representing a consistent 
incentive structure for local authorities to conduct systemic decarbonisation. In this regard, it 
is important to outline that the only relevant platform established by the EU to engage cities 
6  These targets substantially impacted the EU energy system. For example, the share of renewable energy in EU gross 
final energy consumption reached 15.3 percent in 2014 and thus the majority of member states are expected to meet 
their 2020 renewable energy targets.
7  See https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en.
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in the decarbonisation process, the EU Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy8, is a vol-
untary system in which participation remains sporadic around Europe.
Covenant signatories promise to support implementation of the EU 40 percent green-
house gas reduction target by 2030 and the adoption of a joint approach to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. In order to translate their political commitment into practical 
measures and projects, Covenant signatories commit to submitting Sustainable Energy and 
Climate Action Plans (SECAP) outlining the steps they plan to take. Plans are monitored every 
two years to check implementation.
Th e concept behind this mechanism is good for several reasons: the engagement of local 
authorities that are otherwise not involved in the governance of decarbonisation, the sharing 
of best practices via a common platform, and the standardisation of local climate and energy 
policy plans to favour consistency with the overall national and EU policies. However, this 
theoretically sound system in practise has limits. Th e inconsistency is highlighted by the fact 
that the signatories of the Covenant in Sicily equal in number those in Germany, France, 
Portugal, Poland and the United Kingdom combined.
Th e two main reasons for the Covenant’s lack of widespread impact are the isolation of the 
Covenant system within the broader EU energy and climate governance framework, and the 
lack of fi nancial incentives for cities to participate and take measures within the system. Th e 
Covenant of Mayors SECAPs are not related to the NECPs that must be prepared by member 
states in the EU framework, and successful participation in the Covenant system does not give 
cities easier access to EU grants to implement SECAPs. In this context, the Covenant mainly 
represents a platform for the sharing of good practises.
In this context, we consider that in order to successfully pursue its decarbonisation 
pathway, the EU needs to further develop its energy and climate governance architecture, in 
particular to establish a solid basis for tapping into the local potential for decarbonisation. We 
propose a new voluntary scheme to better engage cities in the EU’s decarbonisation eff ort. 
Th is system would be based on Climate Plans, which when implemented would be an eligibil-
ity criteria for cities to access EU funding and national-level fi scal incentives (Figure 8).
For the sake of simplicity, we consider that only cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants 
should participate in the system. Smaller towns could take part if they aggregate at provincial 
or regional level (according to the respective country’s administrative structure). Considering 
that about 70 percent of European citizens live in cities, towns and suburbs, this system could 
potentially embrace about 365 million EU citizens.
Figure 8: Current vs. proposed EU energy and climate governance scheme
Source: Bruegel.
8  See http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/index_en.html.
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A four-step proposal for engaging EU cities 
in decarbonisation
Step 1: understand a city’s carbon footprint and create a baseline scenario
A participating city should start by carrying out an emissions inventory that would quantify 
the amount of greenhouse gases emitted from energy consumption on its territory during 
a specific year. This should identify the principal sources of emissions and therefore enable 
prioritisation of reduction measures.
The inventory would include data from all sectors that represent significant sources of 
emissions in the city: private and public buildings and transport. Data can be obtained from 
public authorities, energy market operators active on the city territory and, in the case for 
energy carriers which do not pass through a centralised grid, directly from energy consumers.
On the basis of this inventory, each city should forecast the development of its greenhouse 
gas emissions based on current policies over a defined period (eg up to 2030). This would be 
the baseline scenario.
Step 2: understand a city’s carbon handprint and create a reference scenario
With an emissions inventory in place, each city can identify the areas of its economy with the 
greatest decarbonisation potential, and can prioritise its decarbonisation policies according-
ly. Areas to be taken into consideration could include: i) built environment, including new 
buildings and refurbishment of existing buildings; ii) municipal infrastructure (district heating, 
public lighting, smart grids); iii) land use and urban planning; iv) decentralised renewable 
energy sources; and v) public and private transport policies and urban mobility. Cities should 
identify the most promising decarbonisation solutions, and calculate their emissions reduction 
potential over the defined period. On the basis of this exercise, a city should be able to put in 
place a future emissions reference scenario that would take into account new policies.
Step 3: create a city Climate Plan
The baseline and reference scenarios would form the basis of comprehensive city Climate 
Plans (Figure 9). To ensure consistency of national and municipal policies, Climate Plans 
could be developed as a sub-component of member state NECPs. This integration of local and 
national governance tools could simplify overall governance by use of a single template.
It is clear that the more effective cities are in achieving decarbonisation, the easier it will 
be for EU countries to achieve their decarbonisation targets, which are fixed at EU level. 
National governments therefore have a direct interest in supporting cities in this process.
Figure 9: the Climate Plan system
Source: Bruegel.
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Step 4: track progress and allocate financial support
Each city should submit biennial progress reports on implementation of its Climate Plan to its 
national government. These documents should feed into to the overall progress reports that 
national governments must submit every two years to the European Commission in line with 
the Energy Union governance system. City progress reports should also be used by the EU to 
determine the eligibility of local governments for EU grants.
Through the European Investment Bank9, the Structural Funds, the European Regional 
Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the LIFE Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility 
and several other initiatives, the EU already provides grants, loans and equity investments 
to cities. Taking progress against Climate Plan goals into consideration when allocating this 
money would incentivise cities to take decarbonisation seriously and make the most of the 
potential solutions at their disposal.
In particular, grants would be key to the success of this scheme. If EU money is given to a 
city to implement a project listed in its Climate Plan, it should be paid in in biennial tranches, 
conditional on positive progress reports. A negative progress report would result in a stopping 
of grant money. This system would mirror the methodology traditionally used for EU research 
funding. For multi-year research projects, the overall grant is not paid upfront, but in annual 
tranches unlocked only on the basis of a successful review of the previous year’s activities. 
A grant-based system would, in short, give the EU some leverage over cities and some 
control over the effective implementation of their decarbonisation projects. EU countries 
could use city progress reports to provide fiscal incentives to cities that implement in practice 
their Climate Plans. This premium system would make economic sense for member states 
considering that the better cities perform in decarbonisation, the easier it will be to achieve 
national decarbonisation targets. Furthermore, successful decarbonisation measures at city 
level could have macro-implications at the national level, as the next section will outline.
Beyond energy: the potential macro-                          
implications of our proposal
An EU energy and climate multi-level governance framework with a new bottom-up policy 
component would improve the functioning of the energy system, and would also have wider 
positive implications in terms of energy security and affordability, environment, health care, 
job creation, economic growth and the relationship of citizens with the EU.
First, smarter cities can facilitate the functioning of national energy systems by helping 
grid operators to better plan and operate national power systems and, in turn, to increase the 
hosting capacity for renewable and decentralised energy technologies at lower cost10. Conse-
quently, smarter cities can also contribute to energy security and affordability at both national 
and EU levels. Furthermore, reduced air pollution and traffic congestion should translate into 
lower costs for national healthcare systems, while increased job creation in local small and 
medium enterprises would have positive repercussions for the overall economy.
9  Notably via the JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas) and ELENA (‘European 
Local ENergy Assistance’) programmes.
10  International Energy Agency (2016b).
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